Sep 7, 2026 · 36 min
Congress questions whether evicting Chinese infrastructure secures networks
This call may be monitored. [Special Edition]
The discussion separates legitimate supply-chain and visibility concerns from politically appealing fixes that leave global routing and basic security weaknesses intact.
- 1The Stranger Pings investigation links Chinese state carriers and equipment to persistent visibility and supply-chain concerns in U.S. networks.
- 2Removing Chinese points of presence may reduce intelligence access without eliminating traffic paths or vulnerabilities elsewhere in the internet.
- 3BGP’s trust model, unpatched systems, and weak inventory practices demand stronger fundamentals than border-based rip-and-replace strategies.
Don't miss
Brandon Karpf explains why removing Chinese points of presence could diminish U.S. visibility without stopping traffic from traversing Chinese carriers.
The brief
Maria Vermozis, Dave Bittner, and Brandon Karpf examine the House Select Committee on China’s Stranger Pings investigation and its connection to Salt Typhoon.
The report identifies Chinese state carriers, equipment, and opaque corporate relationships in U.S. infrastructure, but the conversation questions whether eviction addresses the underlying risk.
Brandon Karpf argues that removing Chinese points of presence could reduce U.S. visibility and intelligence access while leaving global traffic paths unchanged.
The discussion shifts from hardware to BGP, whose trust model allows routing problems to persist regardless of where equipment sits geographically.
The practical answer is less dramatic: improve inventories, preserve logs, patch systems, strengthen vendor accountability, and avoid mistaking network fragmentation for security.