Nov 10, 2026 · 3h 1m
Ukraine’s battlefield edge meets Russia’s strategic endurance
#504 – Russia-Ukraine War: Putin, Zelenskyy, Drones and the Future of Warfare
The conversation connects battlefield adaptation, political aims, external support, and command culture to the uncertain prospects for a durable peace.
- 1Ukraine has improved tactically, but Russia retains greater manpower, economic resources, and capacity for prolonged bombardment.
- 2Drones reshape combat through saturation and rapid adaptation, yet remain dependent on human operators and combined-arms systems.
- 3A durable settlement requires changed political calculations and credible security guarantees, not merely a pause in fighting.
Don't miss
Stewart and Kofman explain why a ceasefire without security guarantees could allow Russia to rearm rather than produce durable peace.
The brief
Preston Stewart and Michael Kofman assess a war that has shifted from Russia’s failed opening operation to grinding advances, localized Ukrainian counteroffensives, and uncertain strategic momentum.
Drones dominate the battlefield’s imagery, but the guests describe a more complicated system: reconnaissance, artillery, mines, infantry, logistics, and human operators working together.
The discussion links battlefield performance to command culture, showing how Ukrainian initiative and Russian reporting distortions can shape operations far beyond the front line.
Putin’s maximalist political aims remain disconnected from Russia’s military means, while Ukraine depends on Western support and continues to absorb severe economic and human costs.
The clearest path to peace is not a simple ceasefire: without security guarantees and a sustainable balance of power, a pause could prepare the next war.
What was said on this episode
49 statements · 10 positive · 25 negative · 2 mixed · 12 neutral
“Ukraine is doing really well along the front line”
Listen at 8:57
Russia is performing poorly militarily in 2026
“The Russian military is doing quite poorly this year in the war.”
Listen at 9:28
- Michael Kofmanon Strategic bombardmentNegative9:58
Strategic bombardment rarely achieves maximalist political aims
“strategic bombardment does not have a great track record or even a good track record of achieving maximalist political aims in the war”
Listen at 9:58
“Ukraine has two of its own localized defensives running.”
Listen at 12:49
Russia increasingly conducts strikes using large numbers of attack drones
“it changed over time from being primarily done with cruise missiles and ballistic missiles to being mostly conducted via saturation strikes using large numbers of one-way attack drones.”
Listen at 14:43
- Michael Kofmanon Drones in Ukraine warNeutral20:37
Drones account for approximately 80% of battlefield losses
“The statistics out there do show that drones inflict 80% of losses.”
Listen at 20:37
- Michael Kofmanon Military dronesNegative21:29
Poor weather substantially reduces drone effectiveness
“Drones don't work nearly as effectively during poor weather.”
Listen at 21:29
Each side employs roughly 8,000–10,000 FPV drones daily
“it's probably somewhere 8,000 to 10,000 per day”
Listen at 24:58
The Ukraine war remains predominantly human-operated
“It is very much still a human-centric war with a lot of manpower involved”
Listen at 27:48
- Preston Stewarton Small strike dronesNegative30:00
Destroying a tank can require up to roughly 30 small drones
“Realistically, we're seeing 10, 20, I think upwards of 30 of these small drones at times being utilized to actually eliminate a tank.”
Listen at 30:00
- Michael Kofmanon Strike dronesNegative30:42
Killing one person often requires approximately five drones
“For people, even though on videos it looks like a one-to-one ratio, it's often not. I think it's often a lot closer to maybe five drones or something like that.”
Listen at 30:42
- Michael Kofmanon Drone engagement zoneNeutral34:33
Battlefield advantage increasingly depends on drone-zone superiority
“this war really began to be much more of a tug of war over who has superiority in this drone engagement zone”
Listen at 34:33
Ukraine cannot sustain Russia’s high-loss fighting method
“Ukraine cannot afford to fight the way Russia does.”
Listen at 36:01
- Preston Stewarton Fiber-optic dronesPositive43:31
Fiber-optic drones threaten targets at ranges approaching 50 kilometers
“That is a serious threat right now at longer and longer distances. I think we've seen them upwards of around 50 kilometers at this point.”
Listen at 43:31
- Michael Kofmanon Russian and Ukrainian military technologyNeutral46:45
Russian and Ukrainian battlefield technology cycles evolve every three to four months
“there's been about a three to four month cycle of evolution of technology and tactics in this war between Russian and Ukrainian forces”
Listen at 46:45
- Preston Stewarton Future warfarePositive51:32
The Ukraine war has accelerated warfare by decades
“we jumped decades in terms of what warfare will be in a very short period of time because of where it's playing out.”
Listen at 51:32
- Preston Stewarton U.S. military drone programsNegative53:23
The U.S. military has not resolved organizational ownership of drones
“We're trying to catch up in a lot of ways in terms of who owns it.”
Listen at 53:23
Russia plans to use Ukraine-style drone warfare in future conflicts
“our opponents, like Russia, do plan to fight in this way.”
Listen at 58:53
Ukraine has held a battlefield advantage during 2026
“for a time, Ukraine has been advantaged this year on the battlefield.”
Listen at 1:02:33
Ukraine currently has only a ground advantage, not assured overall victory
“you can only say Ukraine's advantage on the ground right now.”
Listen at 1:03:35
- Michael Kofmanon Military strategyPositive1:09:41
Military strategies should change when core assumptions prove wrong
“any good strategy must have core planning assumptions. And if those assumptions are proven wrong, you should expect to adjust.”
Listen at 1:09:41
Russia still lacks Western-style junior-leader empowerment
“We didn't see that from Russia. And I would argue that we're still seeing that today.”
Listen at 1:24:30
Bakhmut’s loss was not strategically critical
“the loss of Bakhmut wasn't nearly... wasn't really that critical at the end of the day.”
Listen at 1:35:02
- Preston Stewarton Territorial control in UkraineNeutral1:44:30
Full territorial control likely begins more than 20 kilometers behind the front
“if you're talking about full blown control, as in you can move, you can come and go from that town as see fit, you're probably talking about 20 plus kilometers back from the front line.”
Listen at 1:44:30
- Michael Kofmanon Territorial control in UkraineNeutral1:48:09
Presence in contested terrain does not constitute territorial control
“You have presence, but you don't really have control.”
Listen at 1:48:09
- Preston Stewarton U.S. military nation-buildingNegative1:56:01
The U.S. military should not undertake nation-building tasks it cannot accomplish
“We will send people to language courses when in reality, somewhere along the line, somebody should have said, you know what? This isn't what we can do.”
Listen at 1:56:01
- Preston Stewarton Military leadershipNeutral2:01:37
Military leaders should advise on war options, not decide whether to wage war
“Broadly speaking, yes or no to war, I think is probably not best reserved for the military.”
Listen at 2:01:37
The Russian military adopted many Wagner tactics after Wagner’s dismantling
“The Russian military widely adopts Wagner tactics.”
Listen at 2:13:59
- Michael Kofmanon Wagner tactics in Russian militaryMixed2:15:59
Wagner tactics produced initial success but eventually diminishing returns for Russia
“these tactics spread across the Russian forces, which both led to some success, but also led the Russian military to over-specialize in using assault groups, which eventually led to diminishing returns.”
Listen at 2:15:59
Russia’s political goals exceed its available military means
“Russian political goals, to me, not only seem difficult to achieve, but for a long time I had argued that Russia has a fundamental mismatch in this war between its political goals and the military means available.”
Listen at 2:19:21
Russia lacks the means to achieve Putin’s maximalist objectives
“Russia does not have the military means. to achieve Putin's more maximalist objectives in this conflict.”
Listen at 2:21:30
The Ukraine war will become a strategic failure for Russia
“this war will be seen as a strategic failure for Russia with generational knock-on effects.”
Listen at 2:23:28
- Michael Kofmanon War terminationNeutral2:26:58
Wars end when negotiated settlement beats expected battlefield gains
“it's when both sides see that negotiations and the negotiated settlement is a better alternative to fighting than what they can hope to expect to gain on the battlefield.”
Listen at 2:26:58
Russia has a substantial manpower advantage over Ukraine
“overall, Russia has the manpower advantage and it's not close.”
Listen at 2:29:18
“30-plus thousand casualties a month”
Listen at 2:31:07
Russia can sustain the war through 2027
“Russia has the resources to continue to fight until 2027.”
Listen at 2:32:36
Russia spends about 44% of its budget and 9–10% of GDP on the war
“Russia's spending 44% of the government budget on the war and maybe somewhere around 9% to 10% of GDP”
Listen at 2:32:51
- Michael Kofmanon Russian economyNegative2:33:10
Russia’s war spending is gradually consuming its economy
“the economy is slowly consuming itself.”
Listen at 2:33:10
Ukraine’s war effort remains vulnerable to shifting U.S. policy
“Ukraine is subject to some extent to the mercurial nature or capricious nature of policy of some countries like the United States”
Listen at 2:34:01
The United States has lost leverage over Ukraine
“We've lost leverage over Ukraine as well”
Listen at 2:36:27
- Preston Stewarton U.S. sanctions on RussiaNegative2:36:50
The United States has not imposed potentially available sanctions on Russia
“We've not seen the sanctions layered on Russia that I think could have been.”
Listen at 2:36:50
- Michael Kofmanon Ukraine peace agreementNegative2:41:04
A poorly designed deal could produce only an unstable ceasefire
“this deal make sense and is this going to be a lasting agreement or is it just going to be a piece of paper with a worse ceasefire on it”
Listen at 2:41:04
Russia currently lacks willingness to negotiate
“I don't see a willingness on the Russian side right now to negotiate.”
Listen at 2:43:46
Russia and Ukraine can continue fighting through 2027
“Russia still has the resources and the will to continue the war until 2027, and so does Ukraine.”
Listen at 2:45:45
A ceasefire could allow Russia to rearm
“Russia had the opportunity to rearm.”
Listen at 2:47:24
Russia could emerge militarily advantaged after an unsupported ceasefire
“Russia's in a much more advantaged position, given how things developed after the ceasefire.”
Listen at 2:47:28
Ukraine will remain viable as a state after the war
“Is Ukraine going to be viable as a state and as a nation after this war? I think so.”
Listen at 2:51:11
European support can help ensure Ukraine’s postwar success
“if the rest of the nations in Europe, or at least the key ones, see Ukraine as European and as essential to European security and as a member of that community, they will see to it.”
Listen at 2:51:25
Russia remains a revisionist imperial state rather than post-imperial nation-state
“Russia has not become a post-imperial nation state in Europe.”
Listen at 2:52:36
Statements are attributed to the speaker as said on the episode and reflect their view at the time, not PodLume's. They are not advice.
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